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Digital communication leaves traces that can lead back to the person who 
initiated the communication or their location at the time. Jennifer Cole and 
Alexandra Stickings explore the challenges this brings for platforms that 
claim to offer anonymous crime reporting and ask what can be done to 
assure members of the public that their identity can still be protected.  
 
How data are protected on Crimestoppers systems, including technology standards and organisational 
processes, cannot easily be discussed in the public domain without compromising the integrity of those 
systems. This article is therefore not able to provide specific detail on these aspects. The systems have been 
described in depth to the RUSI researchers and TRILLION project staff responsible for this article, and the 
wording of the descriptions provided here have been agreed with Crimestoppers.  
As the world becomes more digitised and communication through digital applications and social media 
becomes more prevalent, an interesting question arises as to the effect this is having on the relationship 
between law enforcement and communities, and in particular on how the public is able to report crime. 
Allowing for methods of crime reporting to move in tandem with the increase in the percentage of the 
population that communicates mainly through social media will ensure that those wishing to alert law 
enforcement to potential criminal activity continue to be able to do so easily and effectively.1  
Nevertheless, despite the increase in the ways members of the public can report crimes directly to law 
enforcement, there will always remain a section of the population that, for various reasons, wishes to remain 
anonymous in such instances. These reasons range from an inherent distrust of law enforcement within a 
given community, to an individual who may have concerns regarding a family member and therefore does not 
wish to be identified as having contacted the police, for fear of reprisal if it becomes known that the individual 
reported a crime.2In these instances it is essential that mechanisms exist for such individuals to be able to 
contact law enforcement, or another organisation, with full confidence that their identity will not be divulged 
and that there is no method by which anyone – including the law enforcement agency – can trace their reports 
back to them.  
If law enforcement wishes to be informed of criminal activity from all sections of the population, including 
those with whom it may not have the most constructive relationship, providing a method for anonymous 
reporting is essential. This may have to be managed through a third party. Independent research carried out 
by the UK charity Crimestoppers suggests that 95 per cent of those contacting the organisation would not have 
gone directly to the police.3 As Crimestoppers passes more than 100,000 reports to law enforcement each 
year, the removal of this service would be a huge loss of operational intelligence to police forces across the UK. 
There is therefore a real value to anonymous reporting.  
Understanding the benefit of organisations such as Crimestoppers and the reasons for their existence 
introduces a number of issues into discussions on online crime reporting platforms, such as trust and 
anonymity. Ensuring that these issues are fully integrated into the design of current and future crime reporting 
platforms is essential if they are to be used effectively.  
Policing in the Digital Age faces a number of challenges, including understanding the staff capacities and 
capabilities, as well as potential changes in working practices that may result from the need to analyse large 
volumes of data;4 how to police digital communities; and how to effectively communicate with the public using 
social media. Several of these issues were explored at RUSI’s recent conference on the subject in June 2016,5 
but one still deserves more attention: that of anonymous crime reporting. Since September 2015, RUSI has 
been part of TRILLION (Trusted Citizen – LEA Collaboration Over Social Networks),6 a project funded under the 
European Commission Horizon 2020 programme’s Ethical and Societal call to ‘[Enhance] cooperation between 
law enforcement agencies and citizens – Community policing’. TRILLION intends to develop an online platform 
through which citizens can report crimes, suspected crimes, public safety issues and other information they 
consider to be of interest to law enforcement agencies and through which those citizens can receive 
information back from the law enforcement agencies. The project has enabled RUSI researchers to explore 
these challenges in more detail not only in regard to the proposed platform TRILLION will deliver, but within 
the context of online crime reporting more generally.  
As online communication has become more embedded in society, the options for UK citizens to report 
misdemeanours through a number of digital platforms have increased – current options include the Anti-
Terrorist Hotline,7 online portals operated by regional police forces such as London’s Metropolitan Police 
Service,8 victim support organisations such as Somerset and Avon Rape and Sexual Abuse Support (SARSAS)9 
and Tell MAMA,10 independent charities such as Crimestoppers,11 and by using an increasing number of apps 
such as Witness Confident’s Self Evident12 and Facewatch.13 These systems provide a range of functionality 
from making a simple text statement to the police, to filing a report, storing photographic and/or video 
evidence of a crime and enabling business owners to share information on potentially troublesome customers. 
During the evidence- gathering stage for the Report of the Independent Surveillance Review,14 there was 
discussion on whether the way in which digital information can be traced through cyberspace makes the 
promise of delivering anonymous reporting in the Digital Age possible and therefore ethical, as the digital 
traces recorded by such technology now make it easier than ever to trace a report back to the person who 
made it. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that of the platforms mentioned above, only Crimestoppers 
(and SARSAS if it is the victim themselves making the report) offers anonymous reporting. Others, including 
SARSAS (if someone other than the victim is reporting) and the Metropolitan Police, promise ‘confidentiality’ 
themselves, deferring those who want to report anonymously to Crimestoppers. The charity therefore is an 
interesting case study of how anonymity (the ability of the reporter to protect their identity from the 
organisation to which they are making the report), as opposed to confidentiality (the promise that the 
organisation to which the report is made will protect the reporter’s identity to the best of its ability) can be 
embedded into digital crime reporting platforms and also why such anonymity is valuable.  
Anonymity in Crime Reporting  
Addressing the extent to which such concerns over the potentially diminishing ability to report anonymously in 
the Digital Age are valid requires examinations of two key factors: the extent to which anonymous reporting is 
of value (and therefore the extent to which it should be supported if it is technologically possible to do so); 
and whether it is in fact possible (and therefore ethical to promise) to deliver anonymity over a digital system.  
The propensity to report a crime at all – anonymously or otherwise – depends on a number of factors.15 Some 
of these relate directly to the crime itself (for example, the seriousness of the offence and type of crime), some 
to the social context (for example, the level of trust between citizens and the institution of the police, or 
between individual citizens and individual police officers) and some on the reporting process itself (for 
example, duration of the process, methods of reporting and possibility to report anonymously). A number of 
studies suggest that the ability (or not) to remain anonymous is a strong influence in crime reporting,16 
although other research suggests the influence of anonymity on crime reporting is weak or nonexistent.17 
There may be several reasons for this inconsistency, including different objects of study (Carolyn Stone and 
Madelyn L Isaacs studied US high school counsellors who had been informed of a crime by those they were 
counselling;18 Jochem Tolsma et al. studied members of the Dutch population who were provided with 
fictitious crime narratives), different research methods and study designs and different theoretical points of 
departure.19  
Although the importance and role of anonymity for crime reporting in general is unclear, where it has been 
employed, a number of benefits can be identified. Crime reporting can increase dramatically following the 
introduction of anonymous police tip lines,20 and independent research commissioned by Crimestoppers 
indicates that 95 per cent of people who contact the organisation say they would not have gone to the police, 
often because they are reporting from within criminal communities or are closely related to criminals. Two 
examples given were of an individual involved in burglary, who wanted to inform on an accomplice who had 
beaten an elderly woman during the event because he felt this behaviour was unacceptable (though burglary 
per se was not) and a mother who had informed on her son as he set out to commit an armed robbery 
because she would prefer him to be arrested by police en route than shot during the act.21 Those who use 
anonymous reporting mechanisms are not necessarily law-abiding citizens themselves: as well as feeling 
vulnerable to crime, they may fear the consequences of other members of their community knowing they 
have passed information to the police or have something to hide themselves.  
Crimestoppers’s own history illustrates this. Originally called the Community Action Trust, it was set up in the 
wake of serious rioting on the Broadwater Farm housing estate in Tottenham, North London in October 1985, 
during which Keith Blakelock, a police constable with the Metropolitan Police Service, was killed. The events 
were triggered by the death of a black woman from heart failure during a police search of her home in an area 
with a community that was highly ethnically diverse and had low levels of trust in the police or authority.22 
Blakelock was surrounded by rioters on 6 October and received more than 40 injuries, dying from a stab 
wound to the neck. To bring his killers to justice, the police needed information, but as members of the 
community who might provide it were both mistrustful of the police and scared of any other members 
knowing they had interacted with law enforcement agencies, the police appealed for this information to be 
provided with the promise of complete anonymity to any witnesses or informers who came forward. Michael 
Ashcroft, a businessman, offered a reward to anyone willing to provide information that would help the police, 
and this eventually led, along with additional funding from other concerned members of the business 
community, to the charity that became Crimestoppers in 1988.  
Crimestoppers receives reports from citizens and passes only the information about the crime or criminal 
activity, not information about who made the report, on to the police. Encryption on the Crimestoppers 
system, which contains identifying data such as the phone number or the IP address used by the device from 
which the report was made, ensures that such information is not available to Crimestoppers staff or system 
operators. This means, however, that while the charity provides information relating to crimes which may be 
of intelligence interest to law enforcement, this is not legally considered to be crime reporting and the 
information cannot be used on its own in court to bring a prosecution. Crimestoppers operates under a 
covenant agreement with the UK National College of Policing which has enshrined the terms under which it 
can operate, recorded as Authorised Professional Practice and governed by a national policing lead drawn 
from the executive leadership of one of the UK police forces. This is essentially a memorandum of 
understanding, reinforced with formal information sharing agreements between the organisation and the 
National College of Policing which have no additional legal standing.23  
Disadvantages of Anonymous Reporting 
While the main advantage of enabling anonymous crime reporting appears to be an increase in the number of 
people willing to make a report, and therefore in the information available to the police, there are some 
disadvantages. Law enforcement agencies may not be able to follow up on anonymously reported crime to see 
if the reporter has more information as they do not know who made the report and have no way of contacting 
them. As touched on above, in the UK and across the EU, anonymous reports cannot be used as evidence in 
court (though in the UK, Anti-Social Behaviour Orders can be issued on the basis of anonymous crime 
reporting24). In the UK, much of the legal debate on anonymity in crime reporting has centred on three key 
issues: the disclosure of evidence; the legal principle that an accused must be able to question his or her 
accuser; and whether anonymous reports can be considered as sufficient evidence to convict a defendant.25 
The general pattern in UK courts has been that either the defence requests disclosure (that is, that the 
anonymous reporter comes forward) or that the prosecution applies for leave of court while it obtains further 
proof that the accusations made in the anonymous report (that the reports can be ‘adduced’) are 
substantiated.  
The information provided to Crimestoppers is anonymous and thus inadmissible in court. However, it enables 
the police to gather further information. For instance, should person A report to Crimestoppers that person B 
stole person C’s handbag in a certain place at a given time, and then tell the police where person B lives, police 
can then check the CCTV camera at the location of the reported crime. If the CCTV recording shows the person 
taking the bag wearing a distinctive jacket, police can then go to person B’s address and find the stolen 
handbag and the distinctive jacket. Along with the CCTV footage, this proves that person B stole the handbag. 
Thus, while the Crimestoppers report is not used as evidence, without it, the conviction would not have been 
possible.  
There are some specific areas in which exceptions are made, such as legislation regarding whistleblowing that 
allows employees to make confidential and/or anonymous reports of financial irregularity or malpractice. The 
legal framework in the UK, with provision in the Employment Rights Act 1996, is roughly similar to that of the 
US, which is based on the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 and the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act 2002. The situation in the UK does raise issues of compliance with EU data protection law 
which continue to be debated, as some EU directives have yet to come into force.26 In general, however, 
anonymous crime reports cannot be used as evidence in court.  
Anonymity Online  
In addition to general considerations of anonymity in crime reporting outlined above, the extensive literature 
on anonymity in online systems, particularly from the fields of computer science and human–computer 
interaction, points to both advantages and disadvantages of allowing users to remain anonymous when using 
online platforms that need to be considered in this context.  
Advantages come mainly from enabling people to adopt ‘technical, temporary identities’ that enable them to 
create a separation between their offline and online identities.27 In the context of an online crime reporting 
platform, a user from a community or family that is hostile to law enforcement may be afraid of their identity 
being revealed if criminals hack into the system, or if there are corrupt employees who receive and process 
the data and who may inform the criminals. Anonymity will help users to feel confident that their identity is 
protected from such eventualities.  
Anonymity has been shown to provide protection for political activists and dissidents, who deviate from the 
norms and expected behaviour of their society or community.28 This is similar to the example provided above 
of the people who report through Crimestoppers: they do not want to be identified by those around them or 
by the authorities to whom they are reporting. Disclosure of information is higher when the risk to the 
discloser is perceived to be lower, and online anonymity has been associated with people feeling less 
intimidated about what they disclose in online platforms compared with face-to-face interactions.29  
Alex Leavitt suggests that anonymity allows users to feel insulated from how their submissions are received,30 
making them more likely to submit information they are not sure is correct or which they feel may result in 
their being ridiculed. Crimestoppers can also identify examples where this was a factor in the preference to 
report anonymously: a woman who thought the description of a rapist matched that of her neighbour (which 
it did, eventually leading to his conviction) subsequently told the charity she would never have reported had 
she not been confident of anonymity, in case she had been wrong.31 She eventually came forward and 
identified herself following a request to do so which was put out in the media, so that she could be a witness 
in court. By that time, additional police evidence was sufficient for her to feel confident that she was correct in 
her identification.  
Anonymity in Online Crime Reporting 
While current EU legislation does not directly mention anonymous crime reporting, the EU’s 2012 Directive on 
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime does state that 
‘measures should be put in place to enable third- party reporting, including by civil society organisations’, 
suggesting an understanding of the value of anonymity in protecting victims.32 However, it does not set out 
how this must or should be enabled. As a result, there is little consistency in how this is enacted between 
countries, and in the tools and processes available to citizens. In Europe, only the UK and The Netherlands 
offer anonymous online crime reporting through, respectively, the charities Crimestoppers and Meld Misdaad 
Anoniem,33 both of which are affiliated with Crimestoppers International.34 Others, such as the UK’s Anti-
Terrorist Hotline, offer confidential reporting, which means that while the police will know who has made the 
report they will do everything they can under data protection legislation to ensure that information is not 
available to those without a legitimate need to access it. Others, such as the Community Security Trust and Tell 
MAMA, which enable anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim hate crimes respectively to be reported, do not promise 
any level of anonymity or confidentiality.  
Anonymity and how it can be offered have changed considerably since 1985, when the Community Action 
Trust was set up. It offers an excellent case study of the challenges faced in this arena, how they have changed 
over time and some examples of how they can be overcome.  
The technical landscape in which the Community Action Trust was established is very different from that of 
today. In 1985, the majority of crime reports would have been made by using a fixed line telephone. A 
concerned citizen calling the police from a public telephone box could realistically have been confident that 
unless they gave their name and address, the report could not be traced back to them. Even the number of the 
telephone box from which they phoned would not have been automatically recorded by the system. Today, 
the same person reporting a similar crime from their mobile phone is likely to find that the system records the 
number of the device the call is made from (from which the mobile operator may be able to obtain a name 
and billing address), their exact location at the time the call was made, the time they were at that location and 
a number of other digital markers that conflict with the concept of a truly anonymous report. Several online 
systems, such as the survey platform SurveyMonkey,35 appear to give users the option of submitting 
information anonymously, but in practice capture information that enables that user to be traced: such as the 
IP address used by the machine from which the survey was completed in the case of SurveyMonkey, which can 
be viewed by the user who initiated the survey.  
However, in answer to the concerns raised by the Independent Surveillance Review, Adrian Tudway, the 
current head of operations at Crimestoppers, explained that its platform has adapted to the modern 
technology landscape and does still provide anonymity to its users, through a combination of data encryption, 
which strips out identifying markers when the report reaches Crimestoppers, and staff processes.  
In addition to encryption, non-technical systems are in place to prevent reports from being traced back to who 
made them. Crimestoppers keeps no recordings of calls or other data records of its own: information is either 
passed on to the police as an information log or discarded where there is insufficient detail or the information 
does not amount to a criminal offence. Metadata (the information about the data, such as the time at which 
the report was received) is separated from content (what the report says happened). Only content is passed to 
appropriate police forces. Much of this is air gapped between systems, undertaken in secure environments by 
operators who are allowed to take no mobile devices of their own, nor even their own pen and writing pad, 
into their working environment. Pads and pens are provided at work stations and shredded at the end of each 
shift. Reports are collected into batches, which are then submitted to police four or five at a time, further 
conflating information on the precise times they were made to Crimestoppers.36  
Providing anonymity to this level does not come cheap: the Crimestoppers model has considerable operating 
costs attached which are largely met by a Home Office grant, precepts from police forces and by selling its 
bespoke whistleblowing service to the commercial sector, to which it provides information on reported energy 
theft to energy companies and crime involving parcels sent through the postal system to Royal Mail and 
courier services, for example. A further consideration for Crimestoppers is that as current app technology 
generally requires data to pass through networks and be stored on servers outside the UK, to which 
Crimestoppers could not confirm service providers did not have access, online reports have to be made 
through a web browser and URL, a somewhat old- fashioned technology compared with the user preferences 
of the disproportionately young demographic from which Crimestoppers receives reports.  
Anonymity and Data Protection  
Anonymity can be defined in a number of ways, however, and in certain contexts, a less absolute form of 
anonymity – which this article calls ‘relative anonymity’ – may be acceptable and appropriate for online 
reporting platforms. How this can be achieved is set out below.  
First, anonymity can be seen as a tool: in the context of crime reporting, it is a mechanism used to protect the 
identity of the crime reporter – a form of witness protection. Second, it is a technique: a way of realising 
certain other values, such as privacy and trust, which are of particular value to the prospective crime reporter 
and so increase their willingness to report. This is not just data protection, however: while there are strong 
links between anonymity, privacy and data protection, the differences between them are equally important.  
Data protection is generally concerned with the second description given above. It is a way of embedding trust 
in the system by ensuring the user can be confident that their privacy (rather than their anonymity) will be 
protected. This is, however, becoming increasingly difficult when digital traces are likely to routinely record the 
phone number of the smartphone from which the report is made, which may be visible to and recorded by the 
operating system, or the IP address used by the computer used to make the report. Automatic geotagging – 
the process of adding geographical identification markers to content, such as the latitude and longitude of 
coordinates at which a photograph was taken – is automatically built into many smartphone cameras. This 
may identify a user’s home address, if that is where they were when they took a photo they have uploaded 
(for example of antisocial behaviour on the street below their flat).  
This has raised concerns over privacy and anonymity: at the extreme end, governments could trawl online 
platforms to identify people supporting groups such as Occupy,37 and within the context of a crime reporting 
platform, such data could be used to identify the location or machine from which an anonymous reporter 
made a submission and thus identify the person who made it. While this is true, law enforcement agencies in 
the UK are not able to even attempt to recover such data from reports made to Crimestoppers without 
warrants compliant with the Investigatory Powers Act 2016; there has never been a case where this has been 
considered necessary with Crimestoppers.  
Such considerations mean that anonymity is difficult to enact and platforms should be wary of promising it. 
‘Report anonymously’ functions may not be able to provide what they claim to offer, and in such cases terms 
such as ‘confidential’ are more appropriate than ‘anonymous’. Any person wanting to report anonymously 
could conceal their identity using Tor, or ‘onion router’ software – which reroutes internet traffic through a 
volunteer network of several thousand relays to ‘sidestep’ traffic analysis and surveillance systems by creating 
layer upon layer of encryption, like the skins of an onion, which would need to be peeled away one by one to 
get to the original data. Yet while some of those reporting crimes may already use it, most law enforcement 
agencies, and organisations like Crimestoppers, tend to shy away from association with such software due to 
its associations with the dark web and online criminal activity.38 It is also important for members of the public 
who are not technically adept to be able to report using systems that are as easy as possible to operate, 
meaning that the provision of anonymity should be, as far as practicable, the responsibility of the system, not 
the user.  
How and where identifying data are captured and stored within the system, and particularly at which points, 
are key considerations as this will have a strong bearing on how easy – or hard – it will be for an interested 
party to follow the digital traces back to the reporter’s primary identity. There are likely to be at least two 
steps in this process – the data captured by the internet service provider, and the data passed on by the 
internet service provider and which are in turn captured and stored by the platform itself. How this is enabled 
may be different different contexts and may itself provide barriers to, or enhancements of, relative and 
absolute anonymity.  
Anonymity within an online system requires not only encryption and technology but also people and processes 
(Tor software, for example, could not work without thousands of volunteers being prepared to join and help 
maintain its networks). While this has many benefits, encrypted devices and data cannot easily be read, 
accessed or monitored by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.39 This may diminish or negate the value 
of the data to law enforcement officials. Yet not providing this level of protection can lead to a lack of trust in 
the system and accusations of invasion of privacy. It may also lead to users being unwilling to use the system, 
particularly the reasons why it is not offered are not fully explained to, or understood by, the user.  
Privacy and Data Protection  
With regard to privacy in other contexts, data protection often relates to the protection of data which are very 
personal to the individual, such as health records. Where an individual’s identity is not dissociated from the 
information, it is important to know to whom the data relate and limit who is able to see these data. In the 
case of health data, a doctor needs to know whose test results they are looking at, but the individual may not 
want a health insurance company, or another member of their family, to see the same data.  
Anonymity goes one step further, breaking the link between the identity and the information so that the 
information exists independently of any one person. In this context, the information needs to have value in 
and of itself regardless of who entered that information into the system. In this case, the system may 
accommodate the individual’s wish to remain anonymous. In fact, according to the EU’s General Data 
Protection Regulation, ‘the principles of data protection should ... not apply to anonymous information’, as 
this information does not relate to ‘an identified or identifiable natural person’, and only information relating 
to such persons should fall under the principles of data protection.40  
How and where these data are captured and stored within a system, and particularly at which points, are key 
considerations as this will have a strong bearing on how easy – or hard – it will be for an interested party to 
follow the digital traces back to the reporter’s primary identity. There are likely to be at least two steps in this 
process – the data captured by the internet service provider, and the data passed on by the internet service 
provider and in turn captured and stored by the system itself. This second stage may involve different data and 
act as a barrier to or enhancement of anonymity.  
Levels of Anonymity  
There are, in this context, two levels of anonymity that might be built into an online crime reporting system. 
The first is anonymity of the user from the system. This relates to the identifiable information which is 
collected, retained and made accessible by the system. Crimestoppers offers a level of anonymity in this 
regard. The second relates to anonymity within the system: the accessibility of identifiable information of one 
user by other users of the same system and is more accurately referred to as confidentiality.  
To use most online platforms, the user must register with the system (so that the system knows who you are, 
or rather, who you claim to be) or not (so that the system does not know who you are). The choice to register 
or not may confer different levels of interaction with the system: for example, anyone can look at items for 
sale on the online shopping platform Amazon, but in order to make a purchase, a prospective user must 
register with the site, which requires the submission of personal information that enables the system to 
recognise who is making the purchase. Cliff Lampe and Paul Resnick have identified an important distinction in 
how a prospective user will trust a platform dependent on whether levels of anonymity and privacy have to be 
chosen, or whether they are offered as default.41 If a user cannot remain anonymous when they are reporting 
a crime, they may decide not to use the platform at all.  
However, registration does not have to be a binary ‘anonymous’ or ‘not anonymous’ choice: there are a 
number of options for the configuration of systems which offer differing levels of anonymity and may confer 
the advantages of anonymity to some users (for example, the crime reporter) while simultaneously 
overcoming the disadvantages of anonymity to others (for example, the police). This may be particularly 
important in online crime reporting platforms where the police want to build an ongoing relationship with an 
individual or a community where there is reciprocal communication and exchanges of information between 
both sides.  
Online and Offline Identities  
Anonymisation in digital environments is complicated further as the relationship between offline and online 
identities, and between identity and anonymity, is complex.  
All users of online systems have an offline, or primary identity, which comprises the legally recognised details 
of who they are. This includes personal data such as their name, date of birth, gender, current address, 
occupation, nationality and so on. In the case of many online platforms, the user will also gain a username 
when they register: thereafter, this username will be the online identity which they use to interact with the 
system. This becomes their digital, or online, identity.  
Imagine a notional user of an online crime reporting platform who aims to not only report crime, but also to 
inform members of a local community about crime threats and crime reduction programmes in their local 
area. James Roberts is a 36-year-old British taxi driver, living at Flat 42a Altrincham Road, Manchester. He 
regularly witnesses fights and disorderly behaviour in the city centre late at night and is willing to report these 
to the police. He is also keen to receive reports from the police of, for example, road closures due to traffic 
accidents and planned demonstrations that may require him to plan an alternative route. Depending on how 
the registration process is configured, and the choices James is able to make when he registers with such a 
system, varying indicators to his primary identity may be apparent in the username he is assigned or chooses. 
He could be ‘Jamesrobertstaximan’, which gives indications of his offline identity, or ‘Crimereporter4387’, 
perhaps indicating nothing more than that he is the 4,387th person to have registered to use that platform.  
Thus, the online identity James uses when he interacts with the system may closely reflect his primary identity, 
enabling him to be easily recognised within the system by anyone who knows him offline, or it may not, 
affording him a level of anonymity from other users of the system, even if the system itself knows who 
Crimereporter4387 ‘really’ is as it has stored information on the primary identity he entered when registering.  
Usernames and Passwords  
The two-level username/password system is used by many online platforms to enable users to access and 
interact with them in a reasonably secure manner.42 The username is a unique identifier that can be tied to a 
specific person (for example, Jamesrobertstaximan) or role (for example, DrivertaxiH22), and is paired with a 
password that should be known only to the person(s) associated with that username. Together, the username 
and password combination, known as a login, enable the user to access the system they wish to use – often 
from any mobile or fixed device with internet access and a web browser or appropriate app. The system can 
be configured so that a person can set up only one username, or may allow them to maintain multiple 
accounts, or to create temporary accounts which are used only once or in very specific circumstances.  
When a user is asked to register with a platform, the login system can be configured to capture as much or as 
little of that user’s personal information – and thus as much or as little about their primary identity – as the 
system developers and operators have decided is necessary or desirable. Users can be afforded a very high 
level of anonymity, or none.  
For example, RUSI asks for fifteen separate pieces of information about an individual’s primary identity when 
they sign up to an account that will enable them to receive newsletters and information on upcoming events.43 
Of these, ten are compulsory in order to complete the registration process, including a name, telephone 
number, address (including postcode) and an email address. If the individual is unwilling to provide this 
information, they will be unable to register with, or use, the system. The level of anonymity within the RUSI 
system is therefore relatively low: the system and its operators can easily tie a username to a primary identity. 
Users may, of course, choose to give false information – and the system may or may not include various checks 
to ensure that information submitted is accurate, such as asking newly registered users to verify the account 
they have set up following a link sent in an email to the email address they provided – but if a user wishes to 
remain anonymous, doing so is difficult and the process of being asked to submit so much information may 
itself deter them from registering.  
In contrast, the US-based website Reddit asks users only to choose a username and a password that can, 
thereafter, be used to log into the account that was created by the owner of that username. While the user is 
also asked to give an email address which will link back to that username, this is not compulsory and does not 
prevent registration from being completed. No other information is requested – Reddit does not want to know 
(or more realistically has decided it does not need to know) the age, gender, home address, occupation, 
nationality or any other information about its users. They are, in effect, anonymous to the system and to 
Reddit’s owners and operators. The system does, however, record information such as the user’s IP address 
and MAC (media access control) address, the latter being linked to an individual device. These could, 
conceivably, enable the user to be traced, but for this to happen an active decision (such as a court order) 
would need to be made.  
Regardless of how much information on a user’s primary identity is stored, the login system affords users 
pseudo-anonymity in which the username becomes the user’s default identity within the platform. If they 
interact with the platform regularly, trends associated with their username will soon become recognised by 
the system itself and the username by other system users, as will regular behaviour patterns they exhibit. 
Within crime reporting platforms, it may be valuable for the system to capture and store information on users 
who report regularly in a user profile, which will show to the system (and to certain users of the system) the 
quality or otherwise of previous reports made by that individual. Other information contained in a user profile 
could include: how long they have been a registered user; how many reports they have made in that time and 
on what types of crime; how well received their reports have been; and whether they have led to any 
convictions. Such a system may enable users to add additional information to their user profile which may be 
useful to the police, such as whether they are currently working in a security-related job – for example a 
security officer in a shopping centre or nightclub security guard – that might help to prioritise reports they 
make to the system or enable additional information to be passed to them which the police may not want to 
disseminate to the wider public.  
Over time, system privileges – such as ‘approved user’ status, or preferential triaging of reports received from 
that username – might be awarded on the basis of a user’s past activity, even if the system does not know 
much, or anything, about their primary identity. Knowing that past reports made to the system by that 
username have been reliable and valuable may be useful in itself. User profiles can also offer a way for law 
enforcement agencies to follow up with crime reporters, as messages can often be sent via systems’ internal 
messaging systems to the username account, and in fact Crimestoppers uses just such a system to enable 
anonymous reporters to remain in contact with the organisation by logging into a section of the website where 
messages can be left and replied to.  
The login system can, therefore, provide a pseudo-anonymity that both conceals information about the user 
and encourages disclosure through dissociation with the primary identity, enabling individuals to disclose with 
less reservation.44  
Regardless of how much personal information the system chooses to ask a user for when they register with 
the platform or how much data are likely to be captured by the system at the time a report is made, it is 
important to ensure that the system makes clear what level of anonymity – from the system or within the 
system – is being offered and how this is being enacted.  
Anonymity Within the System  
If the level of protection provided by Crimestoppers is not available, the pseudo-anonymity of the login 
system, combined with robust adherence to data protection directives, should be sufficient for a prospective 
user to trust the system to protect their primary identity, but this will depend on how the data are handled 
once inside the system.  
Any crime report made through an online platform will comprise two elements: content and metadata. 
Separating the metadata of a report from its content as early as possible in the reporting process will help to 
provide the strongest possible anonymity for the user within the system if absolute anonymity from the 
system is not available.  
Metadata are defined as ‘data that provide information on other data’, such as the time the report was sent, 
who it was sent by and from which device it was sent.45 Content comprises the information on what is being 
reported – essentially the crime report describing what has happened, where and who has been involved.  
Within any system, content and metadata may remain tied together, so that one is always visible to an 
operator who accesses the other, or they may be separated and stored separately, so that a system operator 
sees only the part of the information they need to see to complete the current action. In the example of 
Crimestoppers, some metadata (such as the IP address used by the device from which the report is made) are 
separated from the content by the encryption software, and further metadata (such as the time at which the 
report is made) are separated by the process through which Crimestoppers passes information on to the 
police. By the time the report is received by the police, none of the original metadata remain, and thus there is 
a negligible likelihood of the content revealing the primary identity of the person who made the report. This 
depends on two separate (and deliberately separated) systems, however: one encrypted and operated by 
Crimestoppers, through which the report is received; the other operated by the police services to which some 
of the information provided by that initial report is forwarded.  
If absolute anonymity is not necessary or practical, however, metadata and content can still be separated – the 
content becomes pseudo-anonymised. This is usually achieved by attaching a tag to the content that can link 
the two ‘halves’ back together at a later stage. For example, content may be labelled as coming from ‘Reporter 
001’, with a separate record linking Reporter 001 back to that user’s primary identity. This may require data to 
be stored in three separate parts of the system: the metadata in one place; the content in another; and the 
data linking the content and its metadata back together in a third. This will help to provide confidence that an 
operator will not be able to determine the primary identity of Reporter 001 from their data, while other 
operators with higher system privileges may be able to identify them when required. This is a simplification of 
the system used by confidential crime reporting platforms such as that of the Metropolitan Police.  
As metadata are often captured automatically, the separation of metadata and content inside the system is 
likely to be extremely important if the system is to offer the perception and reassurance of relative anonymity 
in the context of witness protection to its users.  
Conclusions  
It is clear that despite the concerns raised during the Independent Surveillance Review, anonymous crime 
reporting is possible in the Digital Age, but it comes at a high operating cost dependent on sophisticated 
encryption and robust operating processes. Deciding the extent to which anonymity is necessary and 
furthermore which level of anonymity – absolute or relative – is necessary and desirable in future online crime 
reporting platforms depends on whether the aim is to provide anonymity of the platform user from the 
system, including what information the platform captures from the user at the time of registration and how 
much this enables them to be identified by the system operators and the system itself; anonymity of the 
device used to report from the system including what, if any, information the platform captures at the point 
when a report is made that might be used to identify the device from which the report was made, and the 
extent to which this could this be used to identify the person who made the report; pseudo-anonymisation of 
data submitted to the system within the system, including whether or not all data submitted to the platform 
are stored in one place or some data are separated from others, so that a user may be anonymous in some 
parts of the system but not to the system as a whole; trust in data submitted under a promise of anonymity or 
confidentiality in which the identity or anonymity of the individual submitting the data influences how these 
data are received by the operators of the platform and how the system operators and the system itself can 
trust anonymous reports; and legal status of anonymous crime reports in criminal investigations and 
prosecution. If anonymous reports cannot be used as evidence in court, and the provision of anonymous 
reporting prevents the individual who submitted the information from being traced, there needs to be 
sufficient value in the information provided by the anonymous reporter to make its collection worthwhile.  
The benefit of (perceived) anonymity is that people may feel less at risk and thus be more willing to disclose 
(more) information. The challenges are that the information they disclose may be of poorer quality: they may 
abuse the system. Law enforcement agencies may not be able to follow up with them to ask for additional 
information or clarification. What they give to Crimestoppers can only ever be information and can only 
support evidence found elsewhere, often as a direct result of that information. Anonymous evidence may not 
be admissible in court and thus will not itself lead to a prosecution. It is therefore important to consider not 
only whether anonymous reporting should be enabled through crime reporting platforms, but also how that 
anonymity can be enabled to provide the greatest benefit to all parties.  
There are a number of ways in which anonymity or relative anonymity can be provided. Future platforms will 
have to weigh these against one another to decide whether, on balance, there is sufficient value in anonymous 
reporting to justify building the functionality that will enable it into the system. This will depend on how 
valuable reports made anonymously to law enforcement agencies and their partners are considered to be and 
how important anonymity is to the platform’s potential users.n  
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